History books hold doctrinal lessons for NCW
BY KAREN WALKER
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Rick Kozak / Staff
Retired U.S. Army Col. Robert Killebrew spoke Wednesday at the 6th annual C4ISR Journal Integration Conference, New Tools for War in Real Time, in Arlington, Va.
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British Royal Navy history provides an important clue about the critical role doctrine plays in leveraging network-centric warfare (NCW) systems, retired U.S. Army Col. Robert Killebrew told an expert audience today. Speaking at the 6th annual C4ISR Journal Integration Conference, New Tools for War in Real Time, in Arlington, Va., Killebrew said NCW without evolving doctrine would at best lead to sub-optimized systems and at worst “strangle the way we fight.” He said there were three key doctrinal points that were essential and must be woven into NCW systems. The first of these was commander’s intent – ensuring there was a clear and concise understanding of the commander’s mission at least two levels down his command. “No matter how good your system, somewhere in the heat of the battle something gets screwed up and IEDs blow up, communications go down. But if the operator knows his commander’s intent, he can do it anyway,” Killebrew said. Off Cadiz in 1805, Royal Navy Adm. Nelson issued a statement that, according to Killebrew, inspired the British Navy for more than a century and summed up commander’s intent. Nelson said: “But in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places a ship alongside that of the enemy.” But by 1916, when the Royal Navy was embroiled in the Battle of Jutland, the Navy had become so fixated on process and so enamored of signals, that it lost its ability to win the fight. At the height of the battle, a frustrated Adm. David Beatty declared: “There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today.” Killebrew said signals had become so overwhelmingly important that during the battle, a signal was being put out every 50 seconds. “That worked fine in exercises, but it got to Jutland and it fell apart because victory at sea was pilfered by a bureaucracy that grew across the Navy. They were experts at everything but winning.” Killebrew said he saw much about NCW systems that was excellent, but understanding commander’s intent was even more imperative with these systems. “In NCW, everyone has to understand what the focus is, what the commander’s intent is,” he said. “If we don’t do that, these wonderful systems we have today will be misapplied.”
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