Qais: Lebanese Commandos Hone Urban Tactics
By BARBARA OPALL-ROME
AMMAN, Jordan — Lebanese special forces are honing lessons from last year’s 105-day urban war in the Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp to better prepare for insurgencies that threaten the stability of Lebanon and other states in the region. In a detailed briefing here of the May 20-Sept. 5, 2007, battles against Fatah al-Islam forces in the camps north of Tripoli, Col. Salah Qais, commander of the Lebanese Commandos Regiment, said enemy al-Qaida-aligned forces fought fiercely and to the death. Nevertheless, Lebanese assault regiments, an infantry brigade and his own commando forces — supported by air power, artillery and armor — responded methodically in individually numbered sector-by-sector operations that ultimately eliminated the enemy threat. “These forces wanted to establish a terrorist base in the region. The Lebanese Armed Forces were ordered not to allow this, and we acted to take back these positions and eliminate the threat,” Salah said, addressing the Middle East Special Operations Commanders Conference on March 31. Salah said Lebanese forces went into the operation with very little actionable intelligence and met well-trained, well-equipped fighters “who fought to the death and were unwilling to surrender.” “Despite our lack of equipment and conditions that were not optimal to the fight, our forces fought bravely and achieved their objectives,” he said. According to Salah, the Lebanese Armed Forces were hobbled by a 1969 agreement that essentially prevented them from entering and collecting intelligence in the Palestinian camps. This paucity of intelligence was exacerbated by enemy underground fortifications from which forces waged ambushes and fired missiles and mortars against Lebanese forces. “The enemy demonstrated an ability to move quickly from one sector to the next, often through subterranean means,” he said. Moreover, enemy fighters used a wide array of explosive charges to thwart advancing enemy troops, including remotely controlled improvised explosive devices; booby-trapped residential buildings; and hospitals, car bombs and anti-personnel mines. Fatah al-Islam fighters also were bolstered by highly lethal sniper squads, which forced advancing Lebanese troops to proceed “sideways and frontally, through walls and by use of other evasive, methodical methods of approach,” Salah said. Lt. Gen. George Massad of the Lebanese Armed Forces General Staff emphasized that Palestinian residents of the camp did not actively take part in the fighting, and essentially manipulated by al-Qaida-linked Fatah al-Islam insurgents into using their camp as a base of operations. “Essentially, all the Palestinian innocents evacuated the camps willfully so our forces could go in and operate there,” he said in response to a question about their role in the fighting. With regard to specific urban battle tactics, Salah said his regiment and other Lebanese Armed Forces troops required extensive use of combat engineers and demolition experts to open up new routes toward enemy positions. Lebanese forces also maximized what little air power they had at their disposal by adapting Vietnam-era UH-1 helicopters to drop 250-kilogram and 400-kilogram bombs. “This was an indigenous adaptation, done by our own engineers. It essentially converted these troop transports into gunships,” Salah said. Recounting the battles, Salah said that in the first operational phase, Lebanese Armed Forces attacked from three axes while in the second phase — with the support of combat engineers — his regiment attacked from all directions. After two weeks, navy commandos joined the battle. Altogether, the Lebanese Armed Forces lost 168 men in the battles at Nahr al-Bared, including 34 officers, 34 NCOs and 111 enlisted men. “We learned a lot about urban operations from that experience, and we also believe the enemy was deterred by our actions,” Salah said. He said a critical lesson was to maintain persistent and effective command and control, and that commanders must maintain personal contact with their troops to sustain high fighting morale.
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